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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF GORDON WARREN WOMACK,
Decedent,

Supreme Court No.: 20160544-SC

GORDON DOUGLAS WOMACK,
Appellant/Petitioner,
v.
STACEY LEE WOMACK LEAVITT

District Court No. 893800021
Court of Appeals No. 20130782-CA

and NICHOLLE WOMACK
HENDRICKSON,
Appellees /Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.

THE WILL HAS NEVER BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, CONSTRUED
REGARDING THE DECEDENT GRANTING THE LIFE ESTATE
HOLDERS "THE OIL, GAS AND MINERAL RIGHTS UNDER THE SAID
PROPERTY", AS SEPARATE FROM THE REAL PROPERTY AND THE
EXISTING INTERESTS VESTED IN DECEDENT AT THE Til\,IE OF HIS
DEATH.
Black:r Law Dictionary defines "mineral right" as "[a]n interest in minerals in land, with

or without ownership of the surface of the land. A right to take minerals or a right to receive
a royalty." Ibid., Abridged Si.""<th Ed., p. 687 (1991). The Will at issue herein specifies as follows
under Section VI(l) pertaining to Special Provisions:
1. I am the owner of 160 acres in Uintah County, State of Utah, described as follows:

Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Uintah Special Base and Meridian
Section 16: Northwest Quarter

Said property should be divided among my aforesaid children, share and share alike,
including to the lawful issue of any deceased child as set forth in Paragraph V above,
except that the property bequeathed to each child is subject to a right of first refusal
upon sale thereof in each of my other children. Furthermore, the oil, gas and mineral
rights under the said property together with any other oil, gas and mineral rights of
which I am seized or possessed at the time of my death, are devised to each of my
children, share and share alike for life, remainder to the children of each of my children,
each of my grandchildren to divide their parent's share by representation per sti.rpes
and not per capita.
R0011; RO 122 (emphasis added). This is the provision of the Will at issue in these proceedings.

Appellant's requested below that their "mineral rights" separately granted to them in the Will
be construed, particularly after extraction of such minerals occurred under the joint lease with
Crescent and since Crescent could not ascertain to whom the proceeds should be distributed.
Appellant requested that the allocated .:'mineral rights" be interpreted or construed by the
district court to mean that the decedent's children, or life estate holders of the property, were
afforded the right to extract and receive royalties, the decedent having granted ''oil, gas and
mineral rights under the said property" as differentiated from the property itself, and as
differentiated from "any other oil, gas and mineral rights of which I am seized or possessed at
the rime of my death ... " by separate references to those rights. Appellant's position relies
upon the plain language of the instruments themselves .
..-\.ppellee's focus has been on a separate portion of this same provision that says
....

" ... remainder to the children of each of my children, each of my grandchildren to divide their
parent's share by representation per stirpes and not per capita." R0011; R0122. Appellees do
not acknowledge they are speaking of a different portion of the provision than Appellant,
simply expecting that their portion overrules or summarily disposes of Appellant's request to
construe by rendering them "remaindermen." Appellees interpret the Estate Order, dated June
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3, 1991 to "state that all of Decedent's grandchildren are to have a remainder interest in oil,
gas, and mineral rights that are included in any asset distributed to their parents." Brief of
Appellees at p. 3. _-\ppellees also claim that "[o]n June 3, 1991, the District Court entered
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, and Order to Reopen Estate, where among other
things, the Will was construed concerning the bequest of mineral rights as to the
grandchildren, pursuant to provision VI(l) of Decedent's Will." Id. Appellees claim that failing
to construe the Will would not result in an impasse, but rather the royalties would be held by
Crescent until the life estate holders pass away then distributed to the remaindermen.
However, Crescent has indicated that it will not distribute until judicial determination, so this
process likely will not resolve the issue.
. .-\ppellees have not pointed to any instrument nor order that has construed what was
granted to the life estate holders when decedent specifically stated "the oil, gas and mineral
rights u.nderthe said property ... are devised to each of my children, share and share alike for
life, ... "R0011; R0122 (emphasis added). Appellees believe this was an empty and meaningless
provision, providing nothing to the life estate holders regarding the mineral rights; however,
that would undermine the plain language provided by the decedent in the Will. General
pro·visions contained in instruments are not construed to render portions of that instrument
meaningless. See, Caft Rio, In": v. L.arking-Gijford-Overton, ILC, 2009 UT 27, ,r 33,207 P.3d 1235
('\Ve

\Vill

not interpret a general contractual term such that it renders an explicit right

meaningless."); see, e.g., Fairbourn Commercial, Im: v. Am. Hous. Partners, Im:, 2004 UT 54, ,r 11,
94 P.3d 292.
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Nonetheless, the Decision from the Court of Appeals had this effect. By detennining
that the 1992 .Amended Estate Order construed the Will as intending to create life estates in
mineral rights-noting these happen very rarely-it then declared that "~]ife estates in mineral
rights, by default, do not encompass a right to any proceeds from new mineral extraction." Id.
at ,117, tiling Calvert Joint Venture # 140 v. Snider and Hynson. This "rule" was ultimately found

not to apply in the Hynson case, which court acknowledged deviations from this rule and then
applied one-a statutory provision-to reverse and remand to allocate proceeds to the life
estate holder. Another deviation noted in Hynson was the plain language of the instrument that
could overrule this "default." Thus, Hynson itself was not a sufficiently sound case on which
the Court of Appeals could rely.
The Decision mistakenly ruled in the first instance, without all the facts being presented
below or on appeal, that an "extraction-proceeds provision" was required to be specifically set
out in the Will, with any absence of this provision being construed in favor of the
remaindermen. No prior Utah law required the decedent herein in 1989 to include a specific
extraction proceeds provision...Although this was improper procedure for the court of review
to make factual findings not meritoriously ruled on by the trial court, its dicta did not even
address the separate issue of the impact of the plain language of the Will granting mineral
rights under the property to the life estate holders. Instead, the plain language was ignored in
favor of law from J\fississippi that actually provided for the existence of deviations, not the
least of which was based on language of the instrument itsel£
UTAH CODE .ANN. §75-3-107(1) sets a three-year limitation after decedent's death on

bringing an informal probate proceeding or a formal testacy proceeding. However, UTAH
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CODE .ANN. §75-3-107(2) states that this limitation "do[es] not apply to proceedings to
construe probated wills ... " The "probated will" herein is evidenced by the Estate Order and
. Amended Estate Order given the formal testacy proceedings. See, UTAH CODE . ANN. §75-3412(1). Contrary to Appellees' confusing analysis in their brief at .Argument I(q, the finality

of an order probating a ""-ill in -412(1) is not separate and apart from -107(2) for proceedings
to construe "probated wills." BriefofAppellees at p. 26. They can and should be read in harmony
to avoid any absurd result. See, Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ,I 12, 223 P.3d 1128 ("[W]e
aYoid an interpretation that would 'embrace a result ... so absurd that it could not have been
intended by the legislature.m dting Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ,I 28, 163 P.3d
615). After a "probated U;ill" is evidenced by final order under -412(1), a proceeding may be
brought outside the three-year limitation of -107 (1) to construe that probated will. UTAH
CODE . .-\NN. §75-3-107(2). The finality of the order does not bar a proceeding to construe.
Thus, the lack of a limitation period in -107(2) applies to final orders under-412(1).
Appellant's "mineral rights" separately granted to them in the Will need to be
construed, particularly since Crescent could not ascertain to whom the proceeds should be
distributed. It is _-\ppellant's position that Decedent's children, or life estate holders of the
property, were afforded the right to extract and receive royalties by being granted "oil, gas and
f

mineral rights under the said property" as differentiated in the Will from the property itself,
and "any other oil, gas and mineral rights of which I am seized or po~sessed at the time of my
death ... " The _-\ppellees and the Court of Appeals mistakenly addre'ss these rights as though
they are specifically tied to the property; however, the Will does not read this way. Further,
such holdings only pertain to the rights maintained by decedent at the time of his death, while
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the granting of rights under the property infer receiving proceeds from future excavation and
extraction. Nonetheless, this issue is simply presented here to indicate that there was no statute
of limitations that should have foreclosed the Petition to Interpret, and Crescent's questions
remain unanswered and the proceeds remain undistributed.

11.

THE GILLESPIE AFFIDAVIT IS PAROLE EVIDENCE TOWARDS
ASSISTING THE QUESTION OF AMBIGUITY, NOT "LATEDISCOVERED FACTS."

"If the will is ambiguous, any rule of construction normally used in other writings must

yield to the intention of the testator as revealed in the instrument." Estate efAshton v. Ashton,
804 P.2d 540, 542 (Utah App. 1990), citing In r-e Johnson's Estate, 228 P. 748, 749 (Utah 1924); In
r-e Poppleton's Estate, 97 P. 138, 140 (1908). "In construing a will, a court must look to the

testator's intent as expressed in the will." Id. "The intent may be 'ascertained not alone from
the provision itself, but from a scrutiny of the entire instrument of which it is a part, and in
the light of the conditions and circumstances in.which the instrument came into existence."'

Id., dting Poppleton at 140 (additional citations omitted). ''Thus, extrinsic evidence may be used
to ascertain what the testator intended." Id. . Allowing this information to be presented is not
akin to presentation of a new will, contrary to Appellees' assertion in their brief.
For the purpose of assisting the trial court in ascertaining the decedent's intent
regarding the mineral rights under the property being granted to the life estate holders,
Douglas presented an affidavit from William Herbert Gillespie, who was the decedent's
attorney who drafted the Will. The Gillespie Affidavit states as follows:
I understood that Mr. Womack's understanding of the life estate created in
paragraph number IV of his Will was that all income and benefits from the oil,
gas and mineral rights, including the rights to receive all rents, royalties, bonuses
and other income from production of said oil, gas and minerals, as well as the
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executive right to enter in to oil, gas and mineral leases on behalf of the grantee
and the remaindennen without liability of waste, would belong to each life
tenant (each of his children) during his or her lifetime. Then, upon death of the
life tenant all of those benefits would go to the remaindennen (his
grandchildren).
R0127.
In the Brief ofAppellees, the Comment to the Probate Code is cited as "intent" of the
drafters, stating that "an order in a fonnal testacy proceeding serves to end the time within
which it is possible to probate after-discovered wills, or to give effect to late-discovered facts
concerning heirship." See, ibid. For the first time, the Appellees argue that the Gillespie
..Affidav1.t contains "late-discovered facts" that cannot be raised.
While the Decision indicated that there is no "ambiguity of intent" created by the lack
of an extraction proceeds provision, it fails to acknowledge the differing interpretations that
the parties hererin have with regard to the provisions of the Will, particularly with regard to
the granting of mineral rights under the property to the life estate holders with remainder to
the grandchildren or remaindennen. Further, such differing interpretations have caused
Crescent to cease distributing proceeds . ..As noted above, this question has not yet been
properly resolved since the Petition to Interpret was erroneously dismissed on statute of
limitations grounds.
If the Will is subject to varying interpretations and is ambiguous, the decedent's
intention becomes the focal point in resolving such ambiguity. Estate ofAshton at 542, dting In

re Johnson's Estate at 749; In re Poppleton's Estate at 140. First, the testator's intent in the Will is
ascertained. Id. ..After discussing disposition of the real property, the plain language states
"[t]urtherrnore, the oil, gas and mineral rights under the said property together with any other
7

oil, gas and mineral rights of which I am seized or possessed at the time of my death, are
devised to each of my children, share and share alike for life, remainder to the children of each
of my children, each of my grandchildren to divide their parent's share by representation per
stirpes and not per capita." Appellant believes this intent is apparent to grant the life estate
holders mineral rights and royalties; however, the Appellees interpret it to mean that nothing
was afforded the life estate holders with regard to the mineral rights, with all royalties for the
benefit of the remaindermen only. If the testator's intent in the Will cannot be determined,
then a court is required to scrutinize "the conditions and circumstances in which the
instrument came into existence." Id., titing Poppleton at 140 (additional citations omitted).
The Gillespie .Affidavit was thus admitted as extrinsic evidence to ascertain what the
testator intended. Id. Since these facts were never at issue before, they could mistakenly be
thought of as "late-discovered facts"; however, their purpose is to aid in construing an
ambiguity in the Will, without which the court would be left only to deal with the plain
language. \Vhile Douglas feels the plain language may be sufficient, the .Appellees' dispute
rendered the Gillespie Affidavit assistive, particularly where Appellees' position-as adopted
by the Court of Appeals' Decision-is that the Will does not address these matters without a
specific extraction proceeds provision. The Gillespie Affidavit indicates that is precisely what
the decedent intended with this provision.
The Gillespie Affidavit was properly admitted in the trial court to aid in .Appellant's
request to construe the Will. It was not "late-discovered facts" barred by the proceedings to
construe, even under the Comment cited by .A.ppellee, particularly since such Comment
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pertained to finality of formal testacy orders rather than to proceedings to construe a Will
under UTAH CODE .ANN. §75-3-107(2).

III.

A COURT CAN PROPERLY ENTER FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS ON REQUESTS TO CONSTRUE A WILL
WITHOUT REOPENING A FINAL ESTATE ORDER.

UT_-\.H CODE . ANN. §75-3-107(2) governs the time frame in which parties can bring

proceedings to construe probated wills. In Estate ofAshton v. Ashton, the Court was asked to
construe ambiguous wording in a will. Ibid., 804 P.2d 540, 542 (Utah App. 1990). As noted
supra, that task required a look to extrinsic evidence not located in the instruments to decipher

the decedent's intent. The Ashton Court stated that, "[o]nce a court determines intent, it must
then 'find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon .... "' Id., citing
UT. R. CIV. P. 52(a). ''The findings 'must show that the court's judgment or decree "follows

logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.""' Id., dting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,
999 (Utah 1987)(quoting Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986)). "The findings also'
"should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.""' Id., dting A,ton at 999

(quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)).
_-\ppellees claim Douglas' opening brief is internally contradictory where it states that
he is not intending to reopen the probate, but seeks "to include" a specific provision, reappoint
representatiYes and correct deeds. The BriefofAppellee states this is "improper procedurally and
illogical to request for a judicial finding concerning the probated Will, where the Amended
Estate Closing Order has been entered, without reopening that matter so it can be addressed
judicially."
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UTAH CODE .ANN. §75-3-107(2) anticipates proceedings to construe probated wills

which, as indicated supra, are evidenced by estate closing orders. Where a proceeding to
construe a Will is brought, it is neither "improper" nor "illogical" to expect a court to enter
findings to judicially detennine the matter without reopening the estate closing order. It is
more akin to a collateral proceeding to touch on matters not previously addressed, at the
conclusion of which a court is expected to "find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon" as dictated by our rules of procedure. Estate of.Ashton at 542, citing
UT. R. CIV. P. 52(a). It would be "illogical" to have proceedings to construe a will and bar the

trial court from entering its determination simply because a final estate order exists. This would
render the starute authorizing proceedings to construe meaningless. Denying parties the ability
to construe probate instruments as issues arise in the future would have a chilling effect on
probate in general. This Court should thus decline to adopt Appellees' position on this matter.

IV.

THE EXISTENCE OF THE LEGAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WASTE DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY BAR TESTATORS FROM
STATING OTHERWISE IN THEIR WILLS .

.Appellee cited UTAH CODE .ANN. §78B-1001, which states that, "[i]f a ... tenant for
life or years, ... of real property commits waste on the property, any person aggrieved by the
waste may bring an action against the person." .According the to Brief ofAppellee, the concept
of waste and life estates are "synonymous" with one another. The .Appellee claims that "[t]here
can be no dispute that Petitioner's use, as a life estate holder, of the oil, gas, or mineral rights
consrirutes waste as to the remainders." Brief ef Appellee at p. 22. This argument, however,
ignores the fact that the Will deliberately grants the life estate holders oil, gas, and mineral
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rights under the property, which would be separate from the real property. Thus, they could
not be charged with waste of rights specifically granted to them.
It is not unusual for a testator to set up their will in this manner. "While the testator
may intend the life tenant to use the property freely with no liability for waste, it is not at all
unusual that he also clearly intends that what is not so used is to pass to other named parties."
Estate ofLanders v. C.I.R, 38 T.C. 828,835 (U.S. Tax Ct. 1962)(the will expressed that "whatever
of this property remains" indicating an intent that wife be permitted to invade corpus). At least
one state has indicated that ''[n]othing in Kentucky law precludes a testator &om granting a
life tenant the power to invade the principal of the estate, even to the complete extinguishment
of the remainder interests, if such an intention is clearly manifested." Duvall v. United States,
246 F.Supp. 378, 379-380 (E.D. Ken. 1965) . ..Appellant is aware of no Utah law, and Appellee
has cited no Utah law forbidding a testator to arrange their estate in this manner, which
arrangement would entirely foreclose any cause of action under UT.AH CODE .ANN. §78B-1001.
Thus, Appellees' analysis is insufficient to show that ..Appellant would be liable to the
remaindermen for waste under the Will at issue herein based only on the existence of a cause
of action for waste in the law.

V.

WELBORN AND OTHER CITED CASES ARE DIFFERENTIATED
IN ADDRESSING REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF LIFE ESTATE
HOLDERS AND REMAINDERMEN, NOT MINERAL RIGHTS OF
THE SAME; ALTHOUGH SOl\IB OF APPELLEES' CITED CASES
ACKNOWLEDGE THE IMPACT OF CONVEYANCE OF MINERAL
RIGHTS AND NOT JUST REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS.

In Welborn v. Tidewater Asso,: Oil Co., the 10th Circuit rendered a very short opinion,
holding that a guardian who held a life estate in the land and made an oil and gas lease of the
remainder interest but did not consent to lessee's development of the land only afforded lessee
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a contingent right to enter the land and develop it after the death of the life tenant. Ibid., 217
F.2d 509, 510 (10 th Cir. 1954). Since the term of the lease expired before the life tenant died,
lessee obtained no title that could be slandered by a lease executed jointly by the life tenant
and remaindennan. Id. In the midst of its analysis, the Court opined that "A life tenant and
remainderman may lease the land by a joint lease and they may agree as to the division of the
rents and royalties." Id. at 510 (footnote omitted). It found that, where no agreement was
entered into, the life tenant was not entitled to any part of the royalties, but only to the income
from such royalties. Id. at 510-511. What is absent from Welborn is the question as to how
specific language in a Will granting mineral rights to a life estate holder would impact this
decision. It can thus be easily differentiated from the instant case.
In Burden v. Gyp[>' Oil Co., the Kansas Court found that "[w]here life tenant and
remaindennent join in oil and gas lease, they may agree as to divison of rents and royalties,
and in absence of agreement life tenant is entitled either to have royalties invested and to
receive income therefrom, or to receive apportionment of royalties dependent on value of his
expectancy." Ibid., 40 P.2d 463, 468 (Kan. 1935). However, the court noted in this case that
"[o]il and gas in the ground are part of the real estate~ .. " Id. Burden represents a historical
practice. It used to be that real property ownership included owning the land, a column of dirt
down to the center of the earth and a column of air up to the sky. This is no longer the case.

It has become commonplace to sell the surface of land. separate from the mineral rights on
that land. Burden does not address when mineral rights are separately afforded to a life estate
holder.
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Interestingly, Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiedermann Oil Co, which was cited by .A.ppellees,
entirely detennined its case based on Bail v. Clark. Ibid., 277 S.W. 323, 324 (Ky. 1924), citing

Ball, 150 S.W. 359 (Ky. 1912), overruled in part on other grounds, Terteling Bros. Inc. v. Bennett, 287
S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1956). In Ball, the Kentucky Court found as follows:
... the surface ownership of land may be in one man and of the minerals in
another; that both in such a case are landholders; that the owner of land may
convey the surface to one and reserve to himself and estate in fee in the
minerals, or ,~rice versa, or may convey the surface to one and the minerals to
another; that the effect of such a conveyance will be to create an estate separate
and distinct in the sundered properties, the one from the other, entire and
complete in fee simple.

Id. at 360. This was likewise acknowledged in Union Gas & Oil Co.
The case of Carter Oil Co. v. M1,Quigg acknowledged the idea that life tenants cannot take
oil from the land over which they have their tenancy, but did not address a life estate in mineral
rights themselves. Ibid., 112 F.2d 275, 280 (7 th Cir. 1940). The case of Barnes v. K~s determined
similarly without addressing a life estate holder being bequeathed mineral rights. Ibid., 127 P.
261 (Okla. 1912). The case of Shulthis v. Ma1,Dougal is likewise differentiated from this case.
Ibid., 162 F. 331,343 (8th Cir. 1907).

In Wilson v. Youst, the Court stated the same concept that a life tenant cannot make a
lease for the corpus of the estate; however, it acknowledged that minerals "may become, by
severance, personalty, or there may be a right to use or take it, originating in custom or
prescription ... whenever conveyance is made of it, whether that conveyance be called a 'lease'
or 'deed,' it is, in effect, the grant of part of the corpus of the estate, and not of the mere
incorporeal right." Ibid., 28 S.E. 781, 785 (W.Va.App. 1897).
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Thus, the cases upon which ..Appellees relied in their BriefofAppellees do not govern the
issues that were brought in the Petition to Interpret, particularly not in a manner that
forecloses a court's authority to construe the Will that contains the different provision. In fact,
some of those listed indicate that the standard rule the Appellees front and that the Court of
Appeals adopted in the Decision should not apply where rights to minerals rather than just
real property are at issue.
The Coun of .Appeals first erred in determining Douglas was seeking modification or

vacatur of the 1992 . Amended Estate Order. The nature of the Petition to Interpret does not
fit any proceeding in the probate code that is subject to time restrictions for the trial court to
foreclose the matter under the statute of limitations or for the Court of ..Appeals to affirm on
such grounds. If the Petition to Interpret was subject to a statute of limitations, the record was
either unclear when such a limitation would begin and required further investigation, or
Douglas was within the appropriate time frame. Lastly, the Court of Appeals erroneously
reweighed the evidence and decided matters not properly before it in affirming the dismissal
by the district court. The Decision should therefore be reversed, and this matter remanded to
the district court with instructions to rule on the merits of the Petition to Interpret.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Douglas respectfully requests this Court to
reverse and remand the Opinion in this matter, and enter any such further order it deems
necessary.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2017.

Isl ..,Tustin Rammell
Justin C. Rammell
..Attorney for Gordon Douglas Womack
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